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1 Introduction
Two fundamental considerations in the design of fiscal policy, and for the success of fiscal re-
forms, are the stability, certainty and predictability of tax revenues1 and the choice between
specific and ad valorem taxes. The interplay between these two considerations—and in partic-
ular the role of uncertainty in the comparison of specific and ad valorem taxes—is the focus of
this paper.
Uncertainty can arise from various sources but, arguably, a dominant source relates to the
volatility (and unpredictability) of firms’ input prices, and so their production costs.2 To
illustrate the role of uncertainty in the welfare-comparison between ad valorem and specific
taxation the analysis makes use of the standard Cournot model with incomplete information
about own, and also rivals’, production costs. This particular information structure introduces
two new elements. Firstly, the equilibrium output, and consequently price, follows a distri-
bution. Secondly, while both types of taxation affect the mean of the distribution, only ad
valorem taxation affects its dispersion (variance). The consequence of this is that all key wel-
fare measures, which depend on the mean and the dispersion of the output distribution, differ
in sign from those obtained from the classical deterministic Cournot model. Arguably, this has
important implications, given that uncertainty is an inherent feature of markets, from a policy
perspective.
The comparison between specific (per unit) and ad valorem (percentage) taxation has been one
of the oldest issues in public finance, going back to Wicksell’s (1896, 1959) conjecture that ad
valorem taxes may have favorable efficiency properties relative to specific taxes in monopoly
markets. This conjecture has been formally demonstrated, within a monopoly framework, by
Suits and Musgrave (1953). Following the seminal contribution of Suits and Musgrave (1953),
a literature has emerged investigating the desirability of one tax over the other under various
market structures.3 Predominantly, most contributions, with notable exceptions to which we
turn below, have focused on deterministic environments.
The results obtained can be summarized as follows. Within the deterministic model, for every
specific tax one can find an ad valorem tax that yields the same marginal cost and, hence,
the same equilibrium output. This implies that the two taxes are equivalent in terms of social
welfare. Since profits under ad valorem are lower than under specific taxation, and consumer
surplus is the same, ad valorem taxation generates higher tax revenue, (see, among others,
1Such issue has been a major concern for many developing countries, Keen (1998).
2As in sectors that are energy intensive. Another example of an imperfectly competitive market
that is characterized by cost uncertainty is the tobacco industry. Cost uncertainty here can be—and
should be—broadly defined to include not only the uncertain quality of tobacco leaves but also the costs
associated with regulatory rules and legal threats, World Bank (2003).
3Delipalla and Keen (1992), Skeath and Trandel (1994), and Blackorby and Murty (2007) extended
Suits and Musgrave (1953) to a homogeneous product symmetric Cournot-Nash oligopoly market. Dier-
ickx et al. (1988), and Denicolo´ and Matteuzzi (2000) impose asymmetric cost structures. Anderson et
al. (2001a,b) allow for differentiated products. Hamilton (2009) extends the analysis to multi-product
transactions and Peitz and Reisinger (2009) to vertical oligopolies.
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Anderson et al. (2001a,b)). Such conclusion, however, need not hold under cost uncertainty.
The driving force behind this possibility is the fact that both consumer surplus and profits are
convex in price, thereby making both consumers and firms risk lovers with respect to price.
Ad valorem taxation generates higher output (and so price) variability than specific taxation
and, therefore, it can lead to higher expected consumer surplus and profits. On the other
hand, tax revenue under specific taxation is linear in price, while under ad valorem taxation
it is concave in price, thereby making the tax authority risk-averse. Consequently, output and
price variability do not affect expected tax revenue under specific taxation, but their impact
on expected tax revenue is negative under ad valorem taxation. The implication of this, and
contrary to the deterministic model, is that specific taxation can generate higher expected tax
revenue than ad valorem. The social welfare equivalence between the two taxes, emphasized in
the deterministic model, does not hold. Interestingly, under certain conditions, expected social
welfare can even increase in ad valorem taxation.
Contributions4 that have attempted to make the link between the comparison of the two types
of taxation in an uncertain environment are Fraser (1985), Dickie and Trandel (1996), and
Goerke (2008). Like all these contributions, our paper looks at the particular link between the
two types of taxation and uncertainty. Unlike Fraser (1985), and Goerke (2008), our focus is not
the perfectly competitive environment but the standard Cournot model of output competition.
Dickie and Trandel (1996), identify, too, that the equivalence between specific and ad valorem
taxes does not hold under uncertainty, but they do so within a model with externalities and
mainly under demand uncertainty.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the elements of the model. Section
3 describes the equilibrium and derives the equilibrium output and profits, under both types
of taxation. Section 4 compares profits and tax revenues under the two taxes. Section 5 deals
with consumer and social surplus. Finally, Section 6 briefly concludes.
2 The structure of the model
To show that the desirability of one form of tax over the other crucially depends on the
information available to firms regarding own and rival costs, this paper analyzes a linear-
quadratic model with cost uncertainty. This is a tractable model that gives rise to linear
conditional expectations that yield closed form solutions and, therefore, a computable (and
unique) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.5 It is worth emphasizing—something that will become
apparent later on—that the deterministic model (with linear demands) that has been exten-
sively employed in the literature is a special case of the incomplete information model used
here.
4Perloff and Wu (2007) also emphasize the fact that tax incidence on consumers differ in markets with
a price distribution, and so a tax might have an uneven effect on various parts of the price distribution.
While this element appears in the model here, too, the framework of Perloff and Wu (2007) bears no
resemblance to the framework that is being used here.
5See Gal-Or (1987), Li et al. (1987), and Vives (1999) for more details.
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The model features two firms that produce a homogenous good.6 Market demand is linear in
output and given by7
p(x1 + x2) = A− (x1 + x2) , (1)
where xi denotes the level of output of firm i = 1, 2. Both firms have a linear cost structure
with marginal cost ci, which in the absence of taxation is given by ci = θi.8 It is assumed that
(θ1, θ2) follow a prior distribution, with the prior marginal density of θ1 and θ2 being identical
and equal to g (θi), and E (θi) = θ¯ ≥ 0, Var(θi) = σ, Cov(θ1, θ2) = h ≤ σ, with h ≥ 0. Each
firm receives a signal si about θi. The signal si is an unbiased estimate of the true marginal
cost, in the sense that E (si|θi) = θi and E [Var(si|θi)] = m. Conditional on θ1 and θ2, s1 and
s2 are independently distributed according to the conditional density function z (si|θi). The
precision of the signal si is 1/m, whereas the precision of the prior distribution of θi is 1/σ. It
is assumed that the posterior density z (·) and the prior density g (·) give rise to the following
linear posterior expected values
E (θi|si) = b+Bsi, i = 1, 2 , (2)
E (si|sj) = f + Fsi, i 6= j . (3)
Prior-posterior distribution functions that satisfy the linearity assumption in (2) and (3) include
the Beta-Binomial, Gamma-Poisson, and Normal-Normal. The following Lemma derives the
coefficients of the posterior expectations (all proofs can be found in the Appendices Section).
Lemma 1
E (θi|si) = m
σ +m
θ¯ +
σ
σ +m
si, i = 1, 2 , (4)
E (sj |si) = σ +m− h
σ +m
θ¯ +
h
σ +m
si, i 6= j . (5)
Lemma 1 simply states that the conditional expectations are a weighted average of the prior
mean θ and the signal si. The weights depend on the conditional expected variance of the
signal m, the prior variance of the cost σ and, for equation (5), the covariance between the
costs h. An example based on the prior-posterior Beta-Binomial distribution functions, and
one that we make use of later on, is given below. This distribution function guarantees that
the marginal cost is positive for all realizations of uncertainty.
Example (Beta-Binomial).9 Suppose that the marginal cost of firm i can be either high cH ,
with probability θi, or low cL, with probability 1 − θi. Suppose also that θi is distributed on
6The analysis extends straightforwardly to any fixed number of firms, and to differentiated products,
with either Bertrand or Cournot competition but with cost uncertainty. For expositional brevity, the
focus here is on the duopoly case with homogeneous products and quantity competition.
7The utility function considered is of the form u(x, y) = Ax − x2/2 + y with budget constraint
I = px + y (where x = x1 + x2 and y is the numeraire good). Notice, for later use, that, in this case,
consumer surplus (denoted by CS) is given by CS = (A− p)2/2.
8Implicitly in the analysis there is also a deterministic component of the marginal cost which is
absorbed by the intercept of the demand A.
9An example based on the Gamma-Poisson distribution is available upon request.
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[0, 1], independently between the two firms, according to a Beta distribution with parameters
α and β. Thus, for any θi, the expected marginal cost of firm i is given by cH + θiγ, where
γ ≡ cL − cH . Before choosing output xi, firm i receives a signal regarding θi arising from the
average of n independent Bernoulli trials with parameter θi.10 For simplicity, and without any
loss of generality, set γ = 1. It is, thus, the case that the likelihood of the signal si is 1/n
Binomial (n, θi), with Var(si|θi) = θi (1− θi) /n and m = E [Var (si|θi)] = [(α+ β) Var (θi)] /n,
where Var(θi) = σ = αβ/
[
(α+ β)2 (α+ β + 1)
]
and, thus, m = αβ/[n (α+ β) (α+ β + 1].
Variables pertaining to specific (unit) taxation are denoted by u, whereas those pertaining to
ad valorem taxation are denoted by v. Denoting by t the per unit tax rate, λ the ad valorem
tax rate, q the producer prices, and p the consumer prices, then
pu = qu + t ; pv = qv(1 + λ) . (6)
Firm i’s marginal cost of output under specific taxation and ad valorem taxation are given,
respectively, by
cui = θi + t ; c
v
i =
θi
1− τ , (7)
where 1− τ = 1/ (1 + λ), with τ being the tax-inclusive rate. Given producer prices and costs,
firm i’s profits are given by
piui = (p
u − cui )xui ; pivi = (1− τ) (pv − cvi )xvi . (8)
The comparison between the two taxes requires a common value for one of the fundamental
parameters. This, as it is typically the case—see, for instance, Anderson et al. (2001a,b)—is
taken to be the unconditional expected marginal cost. Under the two types of taxation, this
cost, following (7), is the same if
θ¯
1− τ = θ¯ + t . (9)
Attention now turns to the analysis of the equilibrium.
3 Analysis of the equilibrium
The sequence of events is the following. Given taxes set by the government, nature draws the
firms’ cost parameters (θ1, θ2), which are unobservable by all economic agents. Then, nature
draws the signals (s1, s2). Firm i, upon observing its own signal si, updates its beliefs about cost
parameters and chooses non-cooperatively its level of production xi. Finally, uncertainty—that
is, (θ1, θ2)—is realized.
3.1 Specific taxation
This model, following Vives (1999), has a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium which is linear in
the signal a firm receives and is given by
xi = ωi + δisi , (10)
10For example, the true cost may depend on the outcome of an uncertain R&D process. If firm i
observes ki successes in n trials, the signal is si = ki/n.
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where ωi and δi are parameters to be determined (we turn to this shortly below).
Central in the behavior of firm i = 1, 2, are two expectations: The first relates to the expected
output of its rival, firm j 6= i, conditional on the signal si. This expected output—taking
expectations in equation (10)—is given by
E
(
xuj (sj) |si
)
= ωj + δjE(sj |si) = ωj + δj
(
σ +m− h
σ +m
θ¯ +
h
σ +m
si
)
, (11)
where the second equality follows from (5). The second expectation relates to firm i’s own
expected marginal cost, conditional on its own signal. This cost is given—following upon
taking expectations in (7)—by
E (cui |si) = E(θi|si) + t =
m
σ +m
θ¯ +
σ
σ +m
si + t , (12)
where the second equality follows from (4).
Firms, given taxes and the signal received, maximize expected profits given by
E
(
piui
(
xui , x
u
j (sj)
) |si) = (A− xui − E (xuj (sj) |si)− E (cui |si))xui , (13)
with the appropriate choice of xui . It is straightforward to show that the level of output chosen
satisfies
xu =
1
2
[
A− ω − δ
(
σ +m− h
σ +m
θ¯
)
−
(
m
σ +m
)
θ¯ − t−
(
δ
h
σ +m
+
σ
σ +m
)
s
]
. (14)
(Notice that, due to symmetry, the subscripts i and j are being suppressed.) This choice
of output, for any realization of the signal, must be consistent with the hypothesized linear
strategies in equation (10). Choosing ω and δ in equation (14) to be consistent with the linear
strategies hypothesized in equation (10), it is the case that
ωu =
A− t
3
− h+ 2m− σ
3 (h+ 2 (σ +m))
θ¯ , (15)
and
δu = − σ
h+ 2 (σ +m)
, (16)
and, thus, the equilibrium output of the typical firm, denoted by ∗, is given by
x∗u = ωu + δus . (17)
Clearly, the typical firm’s equilibrium output responds negatively to its own signal. The reason
for this is intuitive: If a firm receives, for example, a high signal s it believes, following from (4),
that own production costs are high and so it responds, for given rival’s output, by reducing the
production of own output. Such a response of output depends upon Var(θ) = σ, Cov(θ1, θ2) =
h, and the conditional variance of the signal E [Var (s|θ)] = m. These are key parameters to
which we turn to later on.
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Since the cost of production (and the signal received) is a random variable, so will be the
production decision of the typical firm, with, in particular, mean and variance. To see this take
expectations in equation (17) to arrive at
E (x∗u) =
A− t− θ¯
3
, (18)
whereas the variance of equilibrium output is given by
Var (x∗u) = δ
2
u Var (s) =
σ2 (σ +m)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (19)
where the second equality follows from equation (16) and the fact that Var(s) = σ +m.11
Equations (18) and (19), and the corresponding for the ad valorem case ones, are central for
the intuition underlying the main results. It is clear that specific taxation affects expected
output but it does not affect the variance of the output distribution. The reason for this is the
additive nature of the specific tax. When a firm receives a high signal s it lowers its output
because a high s indicates that the marginal cost θ + t is high. Nevertheless, the change in
the marginal cost, due to a high signal (or equivalently high θ), does not depend on t, as the
specific tax t enters the marginal cost additively. This, too, suggests that the slope of the
equilibrium function δu, given in (16) and which measures the responsiveness of output to the
signal a firm receives, does not depend on t and so the variance of output is independent of
the level at which the specific tax is set. This, as will be shown shortly below, is not the case
under ad valorem taxation.
If there is no uncertainty regarding own production costs, and so σ = 0, then, following from
(19), the variance of output is zero, and the model reduces to the standard Cournot duopoly
outcome where each firm produces the ‘certainty equivalent’ level of output given in (18).
Making use now of the equilibrium strategy in (17) into equation (13), expected profits for the
typical firm, after some manipulations, can be shown to be
E (pi∗u) =
(
A− t− θ¯
3
)2
+ Var (x∗u) . (20)
Equation (20) reconfirms a standard result—see Vives (1999)—and one that will play an im-
portant role in the interpretation of the results later on: Firms’ profits are convex in their own
marginal cost and, thus, they prefer high uncertainty about these costs.12
We turn now to ad valorem taxation.
11This follows from the law of iterated expectations that is, Var(s) = Var[E(s|θ)] + Eθ[Var(s|θ)] =
σ +m.
12Or, to put it differently, firms exhibit risk loving behavior.
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3.2 Ad valorem taxation
The details for ad valorem taxation are similar to those under specific taxation, and in order
to avoid repetition they are omitted. It suffices here, however, to state that the typical firm’s
equilibrium output strategy is
x∗v = ωv + δvs , (21)
where
ωv =
A
3
− (h+ 2m− σ) θ¯
3 (1− τ) (h+ 2 (σ +m)) , (22)
and
δv = − 1(1− τ)
σ
h+ 2 (σ +m)
. (23)
A firm’s output is, then, distributed with mean
E (x∗v) =
A
3
− θ¯
3 (1− τ) , (24)
and variance
Var (x∗v) = δ
2
vVar (s) =
1
(1− τ)2
σ2(σ +m)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (25)
where, again, Var (s) = σ+m. As in the case of specific taxation, when there is no uncertainty
regarding own production costs, the equilibrium reduces to the standard Cournot outcome,
where each firm produces the level of output given in equation (24). With uncertainty, higher
signal implies lower output. The most crucial difference with specific taxation is that ad valorem
taxation affects not only the mean of the distribution but also the variance (as can be seen from
(25)). This is because the change in the marginal cost θ/(1− τ) when s changes does depend
on τ , simply because ad valorem taxation, unlike specific, enters in a nonadditive way. This
dependence affects the slope δv of the typical firm’s equilibrium output response to own signal
and, consequently, the variance of output. Close inspection of the typical firm’s equilibrium
output response to own signal under the two types of taxation reveals that—for any ad valorem
tax rate τ and for given signal s—ad valorem taxation gives rise to a more responsive output
than specific taxation. To see this, it is easy to verify—following from (16) and (23)—that
δv =
1
1− τ δu , (26)
and so for any given signal s, and for τ < 1, ∂x∗v/∂s = δv > ∂x∗u/∂s = δu. This in turn implies,
following from (19) and (25), that the variance of output under ad valorem taxation is higher
than the variance of output under specific taxation. To emphasize:
Proposition 1 (Higher output variance under ad valorem) The variance of output un-
der ad valorem taxation, all other things being equal, is higher than under specific.
It is also straightforward to verify, following from (15) and (22), that when expected effective
costs are the same (and so equation (9) holds), expected output is the same under both ad
valorem and specific taxation, and equal to
ωu = ωv =
A
3
− θ¯
3(1− τ) , (27)
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and so will be expected prices. This will be the basis of comparison for the two types of
taxation.
Notice, to complete the description, the typical firm’s expected profits are given by
E (pi∗v) = (1− τ)
[(
A (1− τ)− θ¯
3 (1− τ)
)2
+ Var(x∗v)
]
, (28)
and, thus, in this case, too, expected profits depend positively on output variability.
4 Profit and tax revenue comparison
In the deterministic Cournot model ad valorem taxation, compared to specific, is associated
with lower profits and, therefore, higher tax revenue; a point emphasized in, among others,
Delipalla and Keen (1992), and Anderson et al. (2001a,b). Such comparisons, however—and
this is an issue at the heart of this paper—fail to hold when production cost is not deterministic.
We turn to this next, starting from the comparison of profits.
4.1 Profits
The difference in expected profits under the two types of taxation, for any t and τ and evaluated
at the same effective cost using (9), is given—following from (19), (20), (25), and (28)—by
E (pi∗v)− E (pi∗u) = −
τ
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯)2
9(1− τ)2 +
τ
(1− τ)
σ2(σ +m)
(h+ 2(σ +m))2
. (29)
It is, thus, the case that the balance of the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation
depends on the two terms on the right-hand-side of (29): The first one reflects the difference
in profits when the variance of output σ is zero. The second term, captures the difference
in profits when taxation (ad valorem and specific) affects the output and price distributions.
Clearly, the first term is negative and, thus, points to a dominant (in terms of profits generated)
specific taxation. The sign of the second term is positive and points towards a dominant ad
valorem (in terms of profits generated) tax. Interestingly, the latter term dominates the former
if the variance of output σ is sufficiently high. To emphasize:13
Proposition 2 (Profits comparison) If, all other things being equal, the variance of output
is sufficiently high, (expected) profits are higher under ad valorem than specific taxation.
Proposition 2 emphasizes that, contrary to the deterministic models, profits can be higher
under ad valorem taxation when the variance of output is sufficiently high. The intuition for
this comparison is as follows. As we alluded to previously, profits are convex in the marginal
cost and so the signals firms receive. This implies that the loss of profits when the signal is
13It is not difficult to find examples for which this holds. Suppose, to see such possibility, that
costs (between firms) are uncorrelated and so h = 0. In this case, equation (29) is strictly positive
if σ2/ (4 (σ +m)) >
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯)2 / (9(1− τ)). Clearly, given that the right-hand-side of the latter
condition is independent of the variance parameters σ and m, one can find parameter values such that
the above inequality holds.
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high (and, hence, the marginal cost is high) is less than the gain when the signal is low. As
a result, higher variance increases expected profits. Since, as showed earlier, only ad valorem
taxation affects the variance of output, it is the ad valorem tax that generates higher variance
and makes higher expected profits possible, even when the two taxes yield the same expected
marginal cost. We turn now to the comparison of tax revenues.
4.2 Tax revenues
Expected tax revenues differ under both types of tax. The difference hinges upon the way
the signals (a noisy proxy for marginal costs) received by firms affect revenues. Under specific
taxation tax revenues are linear in the signals. Therefore, expected tax revenues do not depend
on the variance of output, as it is indeed shown below (evaluated at equal effective costs using
(9))
E (r∗u) =
2θ¯τ
3 (1− τ)2
[
A (1− τ)− θ¯] . (30)
Under ad valorem taxation a lower signal raises output, but decreases consumer price pv and,
consequently, producer price qv. The consequence of this is that tax revenues are concave in the
signals. The implication of this is that the tax authority, under ad valorem taxation, becomes
risk averse, and, therefore, higher variance lowers expected revenues. This latter observation
can be seen from the expected tax revenues under ad valorem taxation
E (r∗v) =
2τ
(
A (1− τ) + 2θ¯) (A (1− τ)− θ¯)
9 (1− τ)2 −
2τσ2
(1− τ)2
h+ σ +m
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (31)
which is decreasing in the variance (that appears in the second term on the right-hand-side).
If the variance σ is zero and the effective cost is the same, then, ad valorem dominates in
terms of tax revenues. Indeed, setting σ = 0 and taking the difference between tax revenue
under the two types of taxation, making use of (30) and (31), one arrives at E (r∗v)−E (r∗u) =
2τ
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯)2 / (9(1− τ)2) > 0. This confirms the result in Anderson et al. (2001a).
Interestingly, however, the dominance of ad valorem taxation might not hold in the presence
of cost uncertainty. Comparing expected total revenues in this case we have that
E (r∗v)− E (r∗u) =
2τ
(1− τ)2
[(
A (1− τ)− θ¯)2
9
− σ
2 (σ +m+ h)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
]
. (32)
Close inspection of equation (32) reveals that specific taxation is more likely to generate higher
expected revenues if the variance σ is high enough. To demonstrate the possibility that specific
taxation revenue-dominates ad valorem, consider the Beta-Binomial example introduced earlier.
Assume also that the marginal cost θ is distributed according to a Beta distribution with
parameters α = 1/2 and β = 1, that the intercept of demand is A = 3/2, and that h = (1/2)σ
(with n = 10). Figure 1 depicts expected tax revenue when the variance σ = 0 (left panel)
and when σ > 0 according to the Beta-Binomial parameters (right panel). When the variance
σ = 0, ad valorem taxation (dashed curve) revenue-dominates specific taxation (solid curve),
but with variance σ > 0 the reverse can be true. The consequence of this is that, interestingly,
in an uncertain environment, there exists high enough (expected) tax revenue targets that can
only be attained with specific taxation. To summarize the preceding discussion:
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Figure 1: Expected tax revenues, Beta-Binomial
Proposition 3 (Tax revenue comparison) If, all other things being equal, the variance
of output is sufficiently high, (expected) tax revenue under specific taxation yields higher tax
revenues than ad valorem taxation.
We now turn to consumer and social surplus.
5 Comparison of consumer and social surplus
5.1 Consumer surplus
For any realizations of the signals (s1, s2), expected consumer surplus under specific taxation
is given by14
E(CS∗u) =
2
(
A− θ¯ − t)2
9
+
σ2 (h+ σ +m)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (33)
and
E(CS∗v) =
2
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯)2
9(1− τ)2 +
1
(1− τ)2
σ2 (h+ σ +m)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (34)
under ad valorem taxation. Clearly, if the variance σ = 0 and expected effective cost is the
same under both taxes, then, E(CS∗u) = E(CS∗v). This, however, does not hold in the presence
even of a small degree of uncertainty. In this case ad valorem taxation yields higher consumer
surplus than specific. To emphasize:
Proposition 4 (Consumer surplus comparison) Expected consumer surplus under ad val-
orem taxation, all other things being equal, is strictly higher than that under specific taxation,
for any positive level of variance σ.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that consumers like price variability and ad valorem
taxation does precisely this; it generates higher price (output) variance than specific taxation.
14The derivations are tedious and are, for brevity, omitted.
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Furthermore, ad valorem taxation can even increase expected consumer surplus. To see this,
differentiate equation (34) with respect to τ and evaluate the derivative at τ = 0 to obtain
dE(CS∗u)
dτ
= −4θ¯
(
1− θ¯)
9
+
2 (h+ σ +m)σ2
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
. (35)
The first term in the right-hand-side of (35) is negative, pointing to the adverse effect of
taxation on consumer welfare (a consequence, as emphasized earlier, of a high expected price).
The second term, however, is positive pointing to the beneficial effect of taxation on consumer
welfare (a consequence of price variability). It is, thus, the case that for high enough variance,
the second term dominates the first, suggesting that higher ad valorem taxation can increase
expected consumer surplus, at least for low τ . Specific taxation, on the other hand, always
affects expected consumer surplus negatively. The reason for this is intuitive: Price variability
is independent of the specific tax and, hence, the second term in (35) vanishes. This will also
hold next when we examine the effects of the two types of taxes on social surplus.
The above analysis begins to suggest that ad valorem may dominate specific when it comes to
social surplus. We turn to this next.
5.2 Social surplus
The two taxes are not equivalent in terms of expected social surplus. More importantly, ad
valorem taxation can even increase expected social surplus when the variance of output is strong
enough. Expected social surplus is the sum of expected consumer surplus, expected profits and
expected revenues. Expected social surplus under specific taxation is given—making use of
(20), (30), and (33)—by
SS∗u =
2
(
2
(
A− θ¯)+ t) (A− θ¯ − t)
9
+
σ2 (h+ 3 (σ +m))
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (36)
whereas—making use of (28), (31), and (34)—expected social surplus under ad valorem taxa-
tion is given by
SS∗v =
2
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯) (2A (1− τ)− (2− 3τ) θ¯)
9 (1− τ)2 +
(h+ 3 (σ +m)− 2τ (h+ 2 (σ +m)))σ2
(1− τ)2 (h+ 2 (σ +m))2 .
(37)
The expected social surplus under specific taxation when evaluated at same expected effective
costs, following from equation (9), becomes
SS∗u =
2
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯) (2A (1− τ)− (2− 3τ) θ¯)
9 (1− τ)2 +
σ2 (h+ 3 (σ +m))
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
. (38)
It is clear that if the variance σ = 0, then, the second term both in (37) and (38) vanish, leaving
SS∗u = SS∗v . This reconfirms the point made by Anderson et al. (2001a). The intuition here
is the same as the one offered in Anderson et al. (2001a): With effective costs being the same
output is the same under both ad valorem and specific taxation and so is the price.
The difference in the expected social surplus between the two taxes is given by
SS∗v − SS∗u =
(2 (m+ σ)− τ (h+ 3 (σ +m)))σ2τ
(1− τ)2 (h+ 2 (σ +m))2 . (39)
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It can be shown that this difference is concave in τ achieving a maximum at τ = (σ +m) / (h+ 3m+ 3σ) <
1. It is also the case that for τ ∈ (0, 2 (σ +m) / (h+ 3m+ 3σ)) the difference is positive,
whereas for τ > 2 (σ +m) / (h+ 3m+ 3σ) the difference is negative.
An increase in specific taxation t—where t changes according to θ¯ + t = θ¯/ (1− τ), and for
τ ≤ 1—lowers expected social surplus in the sense that
∂ SS∗u
∂τ
= −2
(
A (1− τ)− θ¯ (1− 3τ)) θ¯
9(1− τ)3 ≤ 0 . (40)
Interestingly, this might not be the case under ad valorem taxation. To see this, differentiate
(37) with respect to τ , and evaluate the derivative at τ = 0, to obtain
∂ SS∗v
∂τ
= −2
(
A− θ¯) θ¯
9
+
2σ2 (σ +m)
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
. (41)
Inspection of (41) reveals that for high enough variance σ a tax increase leads to higher (ex-
pected) social surplus. The reason for this, unlike specific taxation, is that, as noted earlier, ad
valorem taxation affects the variance and as a consequence an increase in the tax has two effects
on expected social welfare. On the one hand, expected marginal cost increases which lowers
welfare, but, on the other hand, the increase in variance increases welfare. It is plausible—and
indeed this is the case—that for high levels of variance σ the second effect may dominate. To
summarize the preceding discussion:
Proposition 5 (Social surplus) Expected social surplus is decreasing in the specific tax t.
However, expected social surplus under ad valorem taxation is increasing in the ad valorem tax
τ , for low levels of τ , provided that the variance of output is high enough. In particular, it is
inverse U -shaped in τ . When the output variance is low, then expected social surplus under ad
valorem is decreasing in τ .
The intuition behind Proposition 5 follows from the responses of the individual components
of the expected social surplus with respect to variance σ. Under specific taxation expected
profits and expected consumer surplus depend positively on the variance, while expected tax
revenue is independent of the variance. Under ad valorem taxation, on the other hand, expected
tax revenue depends negatively on the variance. For low levels of τ ad valorem yields higher
expected social surplus because it generates higher variance, but for high levels of τ the negative
effect of variance on expected tax revenue dominates and specific taxation is more efficient.
6 Concluding remarks
The analysis has focused on the explicit comparison of all key welfare measures under ad
valorem and specific taxation. It has been shown that, contrary to the deterministic model,
specific taxation might dominate ad valorem in terms of tax revenues, while ad valorem taxation
might dominate in terms of profits and consumer surplus. While the two taxes yield the same
social welfare in a deterministic model (a special case of the model considered here), this is not
the case under uncertainty. Interestingly, social surplus can even increase in the ad valorem
tax.
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A question that, naturally, arises is which tax dominates if the government solves the Ramsey
problem, in the sense that it wishes to maximize consumer welfare (consumer surplus plus
profits) subject to some given tax revenue requirement. Unfortunately, while it is easy to
demonstrate—as the analytics here have shown—the possibility that, compared to the deter-
ministic model, all key welfare measures change sign in the presence of uncertainty, obtaining
an easily interpretable solution for the Ramsey problem that shows the possibility that specific
taxation can dominate ad valorem taxation has not been possible. This does not, of course,
imply that such possibility does not exist. It does, however, begin to suggest that the model
being used might not be sufficiently flexible to address the analytical complexity of the problem.
We hope to have shown that the results obtained are instructive and could serve as stepping
stones to future explorations of the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under
uncertainty in more general settings.
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Appendices
Proof of Lemma 1.
Given the linearity of the posterior expectations, following Erickson (1969), it is the case that
E (θi|si) =
(
R
R+ r
)
E (θi) +
r
R+ r
si , (A.1)
where r = 1/E (Var (si|θi)) and R = 1/Var(θi).
Since E (Var (si|θi)) = m, Var(θi) = σ and E (θi) = θ¯, it follows from (A.1) that
E (θi|si) = m
σ +m
θ¯ +
σ
σ +m
si, i = 1, 2 . (A.2)
Following from the linear posterior expected values given in equations (2) and (3), it is the case
that
E (s1s2) = EE (s1s2|s1) = E (s1E (s2|s1)) = E (s1 [d+Ds1]) , (A.3)
= dE (s1) +DE
(
s21
)
, (A.4)
E (s2) = EE (s2|s1) = d+DE (s1) . (A.5)
Since
E (s1s2) = h+ θ¯2 , (A.6)
E
(
s21
)
= σ +m+ θ¯2 , (A.7)
E(s1) = θ¯ , (A.8)
solving now for the parameters (simultaneously) one obtains (for i 6= j)
E (si|sj) = σ +m− h
σ +m
θ¯ +
h
σ +m
si , (A.9)
as required. 
Below, we offer the steps taken for the derivation of the expected revenues under both taxes.
Since the derivations of the other welfare measures follow analogous steps, they are omitted
for brevity.
B.1 Derivation of equation (30).
Under specific taxation, revenues are given by
ru = t
∑
x∗ui (B.1)
which upon using the definition of equilibrium output (10) it becomes
r∗u = t
(
2ωu + δu
∑
si
)
. (B.2)
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Substituting the equilibrium definitions of ωu, following from (15), and the fact that
t =
θ¯τ
1− τ , (B.3)
it is the case that
r∗u =
2θ¯τ
1− τ
[
A (1− τ)− θ¯τ
3 (1− τ) −
θ¯
3
2m+ h− σ
h+ 2 (σ +m)
+
δu
2
∑
si
]
. (B.4)
Taking expectations—making use of the fact that E(si|θi) = θ¯ but also the equilibrium defini-
tion of δu from (16)—and after some straightforward manipulations, ones obtains
E (r∗u) =
2θ¯τ
3 (1− τ)2
[
A (1− τ)− θ¯] , (B.5)
as required. 
C.1 Derivation of equation (31).
Under ad valorem taxation, tax revenues are given by
r∗v = q
vλ
∑
x∗vi , (C.1)
=
λ
1 + λ
(
A−
∑
x∗vi
)∑
x∗vi , (C.2)
where the second equality follows from (6) and the definition of pv in (1). Substituting the
definition of equilibrium output given in (21), and using the fact that 1− τ = 1/ (1 + λ), (C.2)
becomes
rv = τ
(
a− δv
∑
si
)(
b+ δv
∑
si
)
, (C.3)
where a ≡ A− 2ωv and b ≡ 2ωv. Taking expectations in (C.3) it is the case that
E (r∗v) = τ
{
ab+ (a− b) δvE
(∑
si
)
− δ2vE
[(∑
si
)2]}
, (C.4)
= τ
{
ab+ 2 (a− b) δv θ¯ − δ2vE
[(∑
si
)2]}
, (C.5)
where the second equality follows from the fact that E (
∑
si) = 2θ¯. Following from the proof
of Lemma 1 and, in particular (A.6) and (A.7), it is also the case that
E
[(∑
si
)2]
= v + h+ 4θ¯2 , (C.6)
where
v ≡ h+ 2 (σ +m) . (C.7)
Following now from (C.7), (22) and (23) can be written, respectively, as
ωv =
1
3
(
A− (v − 3σ) θ¯
(1− τ) v
)
; δv = − 1(1− τ)
σ
v
. (C.8)
It is straightforward now to verify that
ab+ 2 (a− b) δv θ¯ =
2
(
A (1− τ) + 2θ¯) (A (1− τ)− θ¯)
9 (1− τ)2 +
4θ¯2σ2
(1− τ)2 v2 , (C.9)
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and
δ2vE
[(∑
si
)2]
=
σ2
(
v + h+ 4θ¯2
)
(1− τ)2v2 . (C.10)
Substituting now (C.9) and (C.10) into (C.5)—and upon using the definition in (C.7)—one
arrives at
E (r∗v) =
2τ
(
A (1− τ) + 2θ¯) (A (1− τ)− θ¯)
9 (1− τ)2 −
2τσ2
(1− τ)2
h+ σ +m
(h+ 2 (σ +m))2
, (C.11)
as required. 
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